The general health check is one of the most common preventive healthcare measures in many countries. In this study, we propose an empirical approach which jointly models the decision to obtain a general health check and healthcare utilization, tackling the self-selection problem by using eligibility to obtain a health check for free as an instrumental variable. Eligibility has some exogenous variations by design and this helps us to partial out the effect of general health checks from self-selection biases. We apply the model to a large 12-year panel data set provided by the Korean National Health Insurance Service. We find that participation in the general health check increases healthcare utilization and ignored self-selection generates substantial upward bias in the estimates. We also find that the health check effect shows noteworthy heterogeneity across gender and income groups. Before health checks, healthcare utilization of males and people in low income groups is lower than those of females and people in high income groups respectively. However, these become comparable across different groups after health checks. This finding implies that general health checks can be an effective vehicle for health equity.
Introduction
The general health check (which is known under various names, such as general medical examination, periodic health evaluation, annual physical, comprehensive medical examination, preventive health examination or medical check-up; in this study, we refer to it as 'general health check' or more shortly 'health check') is one of the most common preventive healthcare measures in many countries. This typically involves visiting general practitioners or healthcare institutions by healthy adults who do not feel ill, to detect disease and/or risk factors for disease, and it does not include visits for specific treatment or regular visits of patients with chronic medical disorders. A general health check usually consists of a physical examination, blood test, X-ray, ultrasound and/or mammography. The prevalence of general health checks varies by country. Whereas health checks remain unpopular in the UK, they are commonly performed in the USA (Si et al., 2014) . In some countries, it is strongly recommended and/or even required for some of the population. For instance, in Japan it is required by law for regular working employees to receive a general health check once a year.
Researchers have examined the effect of the general health check on various health outcomes and healthcare utilization. First, empirical studies on the effectiveness of regular health checks on health outcomes, such as patients' disability, mortality, disease detection, blood pressure and cholesterol, are inconclusive (Boulware et al., 2007) . A recent review study did not find any benefit with respect to the risk of death in those who obtained them (e.g. Krogsbøll et al. (2012) ). General health checks performed on healthy adults are more likely to produce 'false positive' results (Ship, 2015) and may result in disadvantages such as increased anxiety over health risks, overdiagnoses, incorrect diagnoses and potential harm due to unnecessary testing and medical problems caused by the testing process itself. In contrast, some studies report the benefit of health checks in terms of all-cause mortality and clinical outcomes (e.g. Lee et al. (2015) ). Moreover, many researchers, health professionals and politicians believe that preventive health checks are effective in preventing disease and death in the general population (Public Health England, 2013) . As may be expected from the divergence of the available empirical evidence, some notable health organizations (e.g. the American College of Physicians) recommend against regular or annual examinations whereas some others recommend them (e.g. the American Cancer Society).
When it comes to the effect of general health checks on healthcare utilization, prior empirical studies also provide mixed results. Some review studies conclude that general health checks are associated with further screening interventions, and people who undergo annual medical examinations are more likely to be diagnosed with medical problems, resulting in more healthcare utilization (Boulware et al., 2007; Krogsbøll et al., 2012) . In contrast, some studies report that participation in health checks is associated with lower healthcare utilization and costs. For example, Lee et al. (2015) found that people who obtained regular health checks generally do not need expensive and complex treatments whereas people who have not taken health checks tend to visit healthcare institutions when symptoms or health problems become evident, typically at the later stage of disease, requiring more extensive and expensive treatments.
In addition to the fact that extant empirical studies provide inconclusive results, many of the results reported need to be interpreted with caution because of the following two major limitations. First, the data sets that have frequently been used in previous empirical studies are limited in terms of sample size, the length of observation periods and the representativeness of the subjects (Lee et al., 2015) . Second, the self-selection issue of the general health check is not properly considered. The decision of whether or not to undergo a general health check is mainly determined by individuals themselves. Several factors are considered in this decision-making process and many of these are unobserved to the researchers but potentially correlated with health outcomes and healthcare utilization. Consequently, empirical models suffer from an endogeneity bias. This empirical issue might be circumvented if a field experiment with random assignment is used. However, in this specific context, it is difficult to execute field experiments by using representative samples for an extended period of time, and such experiments may involve ethical issues. Some studies mitigate the self-selection issue by controlling for or matching observed sociodemographic and health-related variables (Bender et al., 2015) , but these approaches are still subject to the selection bias due to unobserved characteristics. Because of this critical limitation, many studies focus on only an association between general health checks and health outcomes and/or healthcare utilization rather than identifying the causal effects. However, such findings on the association have only limited implications, especially to policy makers and healthcare institution managers who want to predict the effect of policy interventions on healthcare outcomes and healthcare utilization levels.
In this study, we empirically investigate the effect of the general health check on subsequent healthcare utilization by using a large and representative data set provided by the Korean National Health Insurance Service (KNHIS). We develop an empirical framework which tackles the self-selection issue by using exogenous variations in the eligibility to obtain general health checks for free (i.e. free every 2 years at even-numbered ages). This eligibility influences people's decisions on whether to obtain general health checks, satisfying the inclusion restriction. More importantly, eligibility has exogenous variations in our data (i.e. whether a person is at even-numbered ages or odd-numbered ages) and these are unlikely to be correlated with health outcomes or healthcare utilization, satisfying the exclusion restriction. Using eligibility as an instrumental variable, we handle the endogeneity problem that is caused by self-selection in obtaining general health checks. Specifically, we modify Lee's (1983) selection model to accommodate our empirical setting. Whereas instrumental variable approaches have widely been used by researchers in business and economics, to the best of our knowledge, this approach has not been used to measure the effectiveness of general health checks. We apply the proposed empirical framework to a large and detailed data set covering a representative sample over an extended period of time (12 years).
Our empirical framework can be regarded as a structural model rather than a reduced form model and therefore it does not suffer from Lucas's critique and can be used to predict the effects of a shift to a policy regime which is different from that observed in historical data (Chintagunta et al., 2006) . Leveraging this advantage, we perform a series of counterfactual simulation studies to predict the effects of potential policy modifications on healthcare utilization such as total medical expenses and patient visits to healthcare institutions. These predictions are useful for policy makers and managers in the healthcare sector, helping them to prepare well in advance for changes in demand due to policy interventions.
From our empirical analyses, we find that overall healthcare utilization (measured in terms of total expenses, expenses for critical disorders or diseases and days visiting healthcare institutions) increase after people have obtained general health checks. There is a significant self-selection bias, which results in the overestimation of health check effects if ignored. Using a flexible model allowing time variant effects, we find that the general health check causes a large immediate increase in healthcare utilization, followed by gradual increases. Moreover, the health check effect shows noteworthy heterogeneity across gender and income groups. Before health checks, healthcare utilization of males and people in low income groups is lower than those of females and people in high income groups respectively. However, these become comparable across different groups after health checks. This finding implies that general health checks can be an effective vehicle for health equity: a critical criterion of societal development. Our study sheds light on a novel aspect of general health checks in public health.
We organize the remainder of this paper as follows. We first provide a brief literature review in Section 2. In Section 3, we develop a framework for our empirical model. In Section 4, we expand on our empirical setting and the data. In Section 5, we present our statistical model and estimation results. Using the model proposed, we perform a series of counterfactual analyses in Section 6. We close with a discussion of our results, policy implications and conclusions in Section 7.
The programs that were used to analyse the data can be obtained from https://rss.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/hub/journal/1467985x/seriesa-datasets
Literature review
This study investigates the effect of general health checks on healthcare utilization by jointly modelling individuals' decisions to participate in health checks and their subsequent utilization of healthcare resources and services. We posit a correlation between the unobserved shocks of the two models and use an instrumental variable to deal with the endogeneity problem due to self-selection. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to deal with self-selection bias in the measurement of health check effects through joint modelling with an instrumental variable. In this section, we briefly review the relevant literature on the effects of general health checks, participating behaviour of individuals in general health checks and self-selection biases in other empirical studies on healthcare interventions.
Effects of general health checks on healthcare utilization
Researchers have been interested in measuring the effects of general health checks on individuals' health-related economic and clinical outcomes, such as healthcare costs and the number of visits to hospitals, but the results are highly inconsistent (Boulware et al., 2007; Krogsbøll et al., 2012) . Middle-aged men who were urged to take health checks spent $800 less in medical expenses over a 7-year period than did men who were not so urged (Collen et al., 1973) . Moreover, people who had frequent health checks had significantly lower medical expenditures over a 4-year period than those who did not (Suka et al., 2009) . Opposite results were reported, however, in a study of 710 male employees of a multinational US corporation who were eligible to receive periodic physical examinations. In this study, higher short-term healthcare utilization costs were observed among people who had health checks than others (Bernacki et al., 1988) . Olsen et al. (1976) found a significant difference between the treatment group (health check recipients) and the control group (non-recipients) in terms of an increase in the number of night hospitalizations for the treatment group. In a study of adults with intellectual disabilities, health check-ups reduced preventable emergency admissions (Carey et al., 2016 (Carey et al., , 2017 . Our empirical analyses make use of a data set that was provided by the KNHIS. Some studies using Korean data have also reported significant differences in the use of medical services after health checks. The increased awareness of an individual's health status through health checks has a significant positive effect on health investment (Lim, 2011) . Lee and Park (2014) showed that the group that received health checks spent more on healthcare costs than the group that did not receive them. Also, the deviation in medical expenditures was smaller among health check recipients than among non-recipients. In contrast, Lee et al. (2015) found that health check recipients are associated with lower numbers of hospital visits and lower in-patient and out-patient costs than are non-recipients.
Non-significant effects have also been observed in several studies. The South-East London Screening Study Group (Group S-ELSS, 1977) reported no differences between health check recipients and non-recipients in clinical outcomes, including consultations, hospital admission rates and absences from work. Dales et al. (1979) and Friedman et al. (1986) also reported no significant effects of general health checks on the usage of out-patient clinic services and hospital use. The total medical cost (Burton et al., 1995) and usage of services or short-term and long-term costs (Patrick et al., 1999) of the elderly are also unaffected by attending health checks. For people aged 20-30 years, no significant change was observed in the number of daytime consultations in general practice between attendees and non-attendees of health checks (Thomsen et al., 2005) .
Many of the reported results have limitations in sample representativeness and the robustness of the results due to the short period of observations and small sample sizes. More importantly, the issue of self-selection for general health checks has not been properly considered. Health check recipients may differ from non-recipients with respect to some unobservable variables (e.g. their degree of health orientation and the occurrence of major health events among family and friends), which may also influence their healthcare utilization. Consequently, it is empirically challenging to partial out the effect of general health checks from other confounders. Later in this study, we propose an empirical framework to identify the causal effect of general health checks, accounting for self-selection.
Determinants of participation in health checks and selection bias
Researchers have identified a variety of determinants in participating in general health checks, including socio-economic and demographic variables and the clinical and social cognitive characteristics of individuals (Dryden et al., 2012; Kowalski et al., 2014) . Andersen (1968) , Andersen et al. (1970) and Andersen and Newman (1973) categorized the determinants of an individual's medical utilization (preventive care, secondary care, tertiary care and custodial care) into three factors (predisposing, enabling and level of illness) and analysed their effects. Thorogood et al. (1993) reported that demographic variables, risk factor status and attitudes towards behaviour modifications are influential in attendance in health checks. Seniors who are more aware and have better health information are more likely to use preventive care in Taiwan (Hsieh and Lin, 1997) . Family support, high education and high economic status are also influential in attending health checks among seniors in Taiwan (Hsu and Gallinagh, 2001) . In a study of attendance in health checks among Canadian women, age, income, education and place of residence were found to be influential factors (Finkelstein, 2002) . Health inequality due to social status was indicated as a critical factor in some studies, whereby socially disadvantaged people are more likely to make no response to invitations for health checks (Janßen et al., 2012; Hoebel et al., 2013 Hoebel et al., , 2014 . Piha et al. (2016) found that employees with lower socio-economic positions participate more actively in health checks than do other cohorts. Screening history and general practice visits are also influential in the attendance rate of health checks (Labeit et al., 2013) . In a study of medical checks before school enrolment, the mother tongue of the children's parents was the most influential factor in the rate of participation in health checks (Koller and Mielck, 2009) .
Some studies note that a cautious approach is needed when health checks are evaluated by using observational data because of a self-selection bias that is induced by the participants of the health checks. Weinehall et al. (1998) found that participants in health checks have significantly different risk factors (total cholesterol and blood pressure) than non-participants. Bender et al. (2015) reported that the positive effects of health checks are largely explained by self-selection bias. Endogeneity issues due to self-selection arise in several other healthcare interventions as well. Bavafa et al. (2018) measured the effects of electronic communication between patients and physicians (called 'e-visits') on healthcare utilization, controlling for the self-selection in the adoption timing of the visit. Kim et al. (2014) measured the cost of denied admission to intensive care units, examining the problem of endogeneity arising from correlations between the admission decision and unobserved patient severity. In a study of measuring effects of forced displacement on health consequences, civilian casualties per county are used as an instrumental variable to circumvent the self-selection on displacement (Zilic, 2018) . Paccagnella (2011) handled sample selection bias due to non-response in anchoring vignettes by using the compound hierarchical ordinal probit model and found that the degree of bias is negligible when the collected vignette rate is high.
A major contribution of this study is to develop this line of research further by using a rigorous empirical framework to handle the self-selection bias and to help policy makers by providing unbiased estimates of health check effects and predictions under various modified policies.
General health checks and health screening
General health checks include several major health screenings (e.g. mammography for breast cancer, blood tests to check cholesterol level for heart disease and blood pressure for hypertension) and thus the literature on health screening is highly relevant to our study. Statistical science has played an important role in this domain. Previous studies have primarily focused on the design of screening trials, administrative and quality control tasks, as well as epidemiological modelling of incidence and mortality. Warwick and Duffy (2005) provided a review on this stream of literature. As in the context of this study, the self-selection problem can be a critical challenge in the study of health screening. Specifically, the effect of health screening is measured from people who voluntarily comply with the screening invitation and thus the self-selection issue should be considered here. Baker and Kramer (2005) proposed a method to adjust for the potential source of bias.
Data

Sample research database
This study uses the sample research database that is provided by the KNHIS, which provides mandatory social health insurance to all Koreans. The KNHIS stores records for healthcare utilization and prescriptions of all Koreans and these are used to construct the database. A total of 1476 strata were constructed by age group, gender, individuals' KNHIS category and income level to construct the database. In each stratum, systematic stratified random sampling with proportional allocation within each stratum was constructed by using the individual's total annual medical expenses as a target variable for sampling, with maintaining a sample rate of 2.2%. Stratum samples were drawn iteratively until a maximum absolute percentage error of target variable reached less than 5%. The sample research database consists of 12-year cohort data that include socio-economic and demographic variables (e.g. gender, residence, income level and disability), detailed information on medical treatments (e.g. medical bills claimed by medical service providers for their services, payments for medical treatments and detailed information on diseases and prescriptions) and general health checks of approximately 1 million people (2.2% of the total population) collected from 2002 to 2013 (see Lee et al. (2016) for more details on the data set).
General health checks
One of the major functions of the KNHIS is to implement general health checks to promote early diagnosis and treatment of chronic and critical diseases. The annual budget for this is over $750 million. General health checks aim to diagnose and treat diverse chronic diseases, including cardiovascular disease, obesity, hypertension, diabetes and diseases of the circulatory system, and are composed of a two-stage examination, namely the first-stage examination of screening and the second-stage examination of a confirmatory test. The second-stage examination is performed only if an examinee is suspected of suffering from hypertension or diabetes.
The eligibility for 'general health checks' varies according to one's registered category. People who are eligible can obtain general health checks for free at any medical institution, including community health centres, clinics and hospitals that are registered in advance as health screening centres, after which the KNHIS reimburses their predetermined expenses. Table 1 summarizes the eligibility for health checks. People belonging to categories 1 and 3 are eligible from the age of 20 years, whereas people belonging to the other categories are eligible from the age of 40 years. In category 3, non-office workers can obtain general health checks every year for free but office workers are allowed to obtain them for free every 2 years at even-numbered ages. All other people are eligible to receive general health checks every 2 years at even-numbered ages. In non-eligible years, people can also receive general health checks by paying the cost out of pocket (about W53000 or US $50). The KNHIS sends invitation letters to all eligible people to inform them of their eligibility and provides other information, such as general health check procedures and benefits and a list of nearby medical institutions providing the service. Obtaining a general health check is usually recommended by noted health organizations and the media in Korea, but people obtain it of their own volition.
Sample for empirical analysis
Note that, for the majority of people, a general health check is provided free at even-numbered ages. This variation in eligibility between even-and odd-numbered ages provides useful exogenous shocks to people's health check obtaining behaviours and enables us to partial out the effect of general health checks on subsequent healthcare utilization from self-selection bias. We selected our sample from the KNHIS's sample research database by using the following three conditions:
(a) exclude subjects in category 3; (b) select subjects who reached 40 years of age from 2007 to 2013 (the latter half of the sample period); (c) exclude subjects who were dropped from the database because of death or emigration during the sample period.
Note that, as we cannot determine from the data whether a subject in category 3 was an office worker or non-office worker and thus know whether he or she was eligible for the free check every year or every 2 years, we excluded category 3 subjects from our sample. The final sample comprised 40776 participants over a period of 12 years (a total of 489312 observations). Fig. 1 describes how the final sample was selected, and Table 2 summarizes the key demographics and general health check obtaining behaviour of our sample.
Dependent variables
We selected three dependent variables that capture people's healthcare utilization behaviour. We selected these six diseases from the 'top 10 causes of death' released by the Korean Statistics Bureau (non-disease-related causes like traffic accidents were excluded). Costs for prescription drugs are excluded in both Total.Exp it and Critical.Exp it . Days.Visit it refers to individual i's annual sum of days of hospital visits as an in-patient or out-patient in year t (in days). A constant 1 was added to the values of all dependent variables, which were then log-transformed to decrease skewness and to relieve problems that are related to zero-expense observations. In addition, variables that are associated with medical expenses change depending on the overall price of the medical services, and the values of Total.Exp it and Critical.Exp it were adjusted by the consumer price index of medical services provided by the Korean Statistics Bureau. Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics of the dependent variables and their log-transformed values.
Control variables
To minimize the risk of specification or omitted variable error, we performed a thorough search on related literature and tried to include all relevant control variables that are mentioned in the literature in our analyses. Specifically, Finkelstein (2002) reported that age, income, education and place of residence were found to be influential factors in attending health checks. Piha et al. (2016) reported that the income level of employees is an influential factor in attending health checks. Lee et al. (2015) used age, gender, income level and disability as control variables in measuring the effect of health checks. Accordingly, we included all these control variables in our model. We used various socio-economic and demographic variables of the sample as control variables: gender, age, KNHIS category, income group (a total of 11 levels; Income 0, lowest income bracket;: : : ; Income 10, highest income bracket), degree of disability (Disab 0, able bodied; Disab 1, severe disability; Disab 2, minor disability) and the residential area of the sample (17 provinces and metropolitan areas). The distribution of dependent variables may differ with respect to individuals' characteristics. Table 4 shows the distributions of dependent variables by the control variables (except residential area).
We observe that females used more healthcare resources than did males in terms of all three dependent variables. The people in category 4 (employee insurance household member) use healthcare resources the most; those in category 6 (medical aid beneficiary household member) the least. Also, we observe that in most cases all three dependent variables increase as the income level goes up, indicating that overall healthcare utilization increases with income level. Note that all these findings are based on the aggregated dependent variables over the entire sample period across all people in each subgroup, and therefore general health check effects are confounded in these numbers. In the next section, we introduce our empirical approach, which examines the changes in the dependent variables due to general health checks after accounting for the effects of control variables and self-selection bias.
Model and estimation
The main goal of our empirical study is to measure the effects of general health checks on subsequent healthcare utilization. Specifically, we quantify the changes in the three dependent variables after people first obtain general health checks. In our sample, the count of total general health checks obtained during the sample period ranges from 0 to 7 (0, 43.01%; 1, 31.18%; 2, 16:92%;: : :; above 6, 0.06%). We focus on the first general health check because it separates obtainers from non-obtainers. The second and subsequent health checks depend on the first health check, its results, subsequent healthcare services, and so forth. In our data, the second and subsequent health checks are included in the dependent variables. Our empirical model consists of three parts: 
Health check model
The latent utility of obtaining a general health check at year t, U it , is defined as
where Eligible it is a dummy variable that indicates whether individual i is eligible to obtain a health check for free .Eligible it = 1/ or not .Eligible it = 0/ during a year t. C it refers to a set of control variables, Z it = .Eligible it C it / and A = .α 1 α 2 / . " it is the idiosyncratic error, which captures unobserved random factors that may affect the utility of obtaining a health check. H i refers to the year when individual i obtains his or her first health check. We define the utility of obtaining general health checks as a function of the eligibility for a free health check and various control variables and assume that individual i obtains a health check when his or her utility of obtaining it is greater than or equal to 0. Given H i or the timing of the first health check, the utility of obtaining a health check is less than 0 at t = 1, 2, : : : , H i − 1, and greater than or equal to 0 at H i . If an individual has not obtained a general health check until the end of the observation period T , then H i > T (this is a censored observation).
The dependent variable in this model is H i , which denotes the timing of the first general health check. As an alternative modelling approach, duration models such as a Cox proportional hazard model can be used. However, our approach enables us to develop a joint model of health checks and healthcare utilization and to deal with self-selection bias within a single modelling framework. Modelling duration data in this manner can be regarded as an application of Markov chains. Similar models have been applied to duration data (e.g. Singh et al. (2006) ).
Healthcare utilization model
We define a dummy variable FHC it , which denotes whether individual i has received her or his first health check, as follows:
Equations (1)-(3) imply the following relationship between FHC it and U it :
The use of healthcare services by individual i at year t, Y it , is modelled as
Visit it /}. Note that β 1 captures the changes in dependent variables after the first general health check and thus is the coefficient of our main interest. X it = .FHC it C it / and B = .β 1 β 2 / , and ν it is the idiosyncratic error, which captures unobserved random factors that may affect healthcare utilization. Table  5 illustrates the structure of our modelling framework, specifying the relationship between key variables.
Self-selection bias
There are several unobserved factors in people's decisions to obtain general health checks and their levels of usage of healthcare services. More importantly, these factors might be correlated. For example, owing to a family history of diseases and/or attitude to health risk factors, health conscious people may spend more on medical services and tend to participate in general health checks earlier than do others subject to similar demographic and socio-economic factors. In our modelling framework, self-selection is represented as this correlation between the unobservable shocks of the two models (" it and ν it /. If ignored, this correlation can generate an endogeneity problem, resulting in underestimation or overestimation of the health check effects. Note that " it influences U it and FHC it and is also correlated with ν it . Consequently, FHC it is correlated with ν it , as shown in equation (5). Equation (5) is thus subject to an endogeneity problem (i.e. 
< 0 : : : 0 : : : regressor error dependence). To deal with this problem, we capture the correlation between the two models' error terms. We assume that " it and ν it follow a bivariate normal distribution:
. 6/ Moreover, in equation (1), Eligible it works as an instrumental variable. Eligible it is highly relevant to i's decision to obtain a general health check because it allows her or him to do so for free, satisfying the inclusion restriction of the instrumental variable. In our empirical analysis, we find that Eligible it is highly significant, explaining large variations in health check obtaining behaviours, and thus our estimation is free from the weak instrument problem. We empirically tested for the weak instrumental variable issue and the Cragg-Donald Wald F -statistic (50386.66) rejects the null hypothesis that our instrumental variable is weak (Stock and Yogo, 2005; Bound et al., 1995) . Moreover, after controlling for the effect of age along with other observed control variables, whether i is even aged or odd aged is unlikely to be correlated with her or his healthcare utilization, satisfying the exclusion restriction of the instrumental variable. Consequently, our instrumental variable satisfies both the exclusion restriction and the inclusion restriction and thus we argue that it is a valid instrumental variable. Note that the health check model is defined from t = 1 up to H i . When t > H i , FHC it is no longer a random variable and takes a given constant value of 1. For t > H i , we assume that the idiosyncratic error of healthcare utilization model follows a univariate normal distribution:
Here, the variance of the error term is allowed to change from σ 2 ν to σ 2 ν,a after H i . This specification adds flexibility to the model, capturing the changing variations in healthcare utilization.
Likelihood function and model estimation
Given equations (1)- (7), we can now derive the joint log-likelihood function of general health check and healthcare utilization for individual i:
where θ is a set of parameters to estimate, g is the marginal density function of ν it and Φ is the cumulative distribution function for a standard normal distribution. J 1 and J 2 are transformations that represent the inverse of the standard normal distribution using the marginal distribution of " it and ν it respectively:
. 10/ Here Φ −1 .·/ is the inverse of the cumulative distribution function for a standard normal distribution and F.·/ and G.·/ are the cumulative marginal distributions of " it and ν it respectively. The log-likelihood function for the entire sample is ln{L.θ/} = Σ N i=1 ln{L i .θ/} where N denotes the sample size. A detailed derivation of the joint log-likelihood is given in Appendix A. We estimate the model parameters θ by maximizing this log-likelihood function. Our modelling framework is similar to those of Heckman (1979) and Lee (1983) in that it constructs a joint model of a selection process and the dependent variable of interest and uses instrumental variables for the model identification. A key distinctive feature of the model proposed is that the selection process takes the form of a duration model. To check the validity and performance of the model, we performed a simulation study that confirmed that it performs well in consistently recovering true parameter values, and we also found that, if ignored, self-selection can introduce serious biases into the estimated parameters. We provide details of the simulation study in Appendix B.
Empirical analysis
In this section, we analyse the effect of the first general health check on healthcare utilization by using three different model specifications. First, we conduct an empirical analysis using the model specification that was described in the previous sections (equations (1)-(7), referred to as the 'baseline model'). The effect of eligibility on obtaining health checks may differ by age, and the effect of the first health check on subsequent healthcare utilization may also increase or decrease as time elapses from the first health check. By modifying the baseline model, we investigate the time variant relationships between the key variables (referred to as the 'time variant effect model'). Finally, the heterogeneous effect of the health check is examined by allowing the effect to vary with individual characteristics (referred to as the 'heterogeneity model').
Baseline model
We estimate the baseline model by maximizing the log-likelihood function that was specified in equation (8). Along with the proposed model, we also estimate a benchmark model where the correlation parameter between " it and ν it , ρ, is fixed at 0. Note that the benchmark model ignores the self-selection issue and is equivalent to running ordinary least squares to estimate equation (5). By comparing the results from the proposed baseline model and the benchmark model, we can learn about the direction and magnitude of self-selection bias on parameter estimates. Table 6 reports the estimation results. Eligible it , which indicates whether individual i is eligible for a free health check, has significantly positive estimates in all models. As expected, whether an individual is eligible for a free health check or not is highly relevant and has a positive effect on receiving the first general health check. In all three dependent variables, the baseline models proposed (models 1, 3 and 5) are better than the benchmark models (models 2, 4 and 6) in terms of the Akaike information criterion AIC and Bayes information criterion BIC. Furthermore, the correlation parameter ρ yields significant positive estimates. These results imply that there is a significant positive correlation between the unobserved shocks " it and ν it . The positive correlation indicates that FHC it is positively correlated with ν it . If ignored, this correlation generates upward biases in estimated parameters. By comparing the estimated coefficients of FHC it in the proposed baseline models with those of the benchmark models, this is confirmed. Obtaining the first general health check boosts all three dependent variables, and this effect is overestimated when the correlations between the two submodels are ignored. Next, we check whether the positive biases that were reported in the above estimation results are significant by using a formal statistical test (Clogg et al., 1995) . The t-statistics of the differences between the estimated coefficients of FHC it in models 1, 3 and 5 and 2, 4 and 6 are 11.563, 3.317 and 8.744 respectively. We can thus conclude that the positive bias due to self-selection is highly significant.
The results from the baseline model proposed indicate that the total expenses, critical expenses and number of days visiting medical institutions significantly increase after the first health check. The estimated coefficients of FHC it are 1.388 (p-value less than 0.01), 0.686 (p-value less than . /, employee insurance household member; category 5 . /, medical aid beneficiary householder; category 6 . /, medical aid beneficiary household member; the eligibility for free general health checks varies according to people's registered KNHIS category; people in category 1 are eligible from the age of 20 years, whereas others are eligible from the age of 40 years; people except non-office workers in category 3 are eligible to receive general health checks every 2 years, at the even-numbered ages 0.01) and 0.353 (p-value less than 0.01) in the total expenses, critical expenses and number of days visiting medical institutions respectively. Since we are using log-linear specifications, the estimates are translated to the increases in the total expenses, critical expenses and number of days visiting medical institutions by factors of 4:006 .= exp.1:388//, 1:986 .= exp.0:686// and 1:423 .= exp.0:353// respectively. We can infer that the increased awareness of health status from the health check boosts people's overall healthcare utilization. With respect to the total expenses, the benchmark model (model 2) indicates that it increases by a factor of 4:540 .= exp.1:513//, which is 13% greater than the estimate from the model proposed. Again, our analysis implies that substantial overestimation occurs due to self-selection, which may result in suboptimal policy decisions.
From Table 6 , we also observe that the standard deviation of the unobserved shocks (ν it / before first health checks .σ ν / is larger than that after first health checks .σ ν,a / in total expenses and number of days visiting medical institutions. This implies that unexplained time-and individualspecific variations shrink after first health checks in these two healthcare utilization measures. In contrast, we find that the standard deviation of the unobserved shocks after first health checks .σ ν,a / is larger than that before the first health check .σ ν / in critical expenses. The increased variations in critical expenses after the first health checks might be due to critical diseases detected by the health checks since these critical diseases tend to entail a large amount of expenses.
Time variant effect model
The eligibility for free health checks may have time variant effects on people's decisions whether to participate in health checks. People tend to pay more attention to their health status as they grow older and thus the effects of eligibility among people in their 40s may differ from those in their 30s. Fig. 2 shows the distribution of ages when our sample individuals first obtain general health checks by KNHIS category. We can confirm that the eligibility effect is substantial because almost all individuals who had general health checks during the sample period did so when they were even aged and thus eligible for free checks. People in category 1 are eligible from age 20 years. Fig. 2 shows that people in category 1 (30% of our sample) start to receive general health checks early. Many such people (33% of the category 1 sample) first obtain them when they turn 40 years of age. The other people in our sample (categories 2, 4, 5 and 6) are eligible from 40 years of age and many of them (60%, 67%, 60% and 67% respectively) obtain their first general health checks in the year that they first become eligible for free health checks.
The effects of the first general health check on healthcare utilization may also change over time. The progress of the diseases that are detected by the health checks or alerted attention towards health status may increase or decrease the use of medical services as time elapses from the first health check.
To capture these time variant effects within our empirical framework, we modify equation (1) as follows:
where More40 it is a dummy variable equal to 1 if i's age is equal to or greater than 40 years and 0 otherwise. Cat1 it is equal to 1 if i belongs to KNHIS category 1 and 0 otherwise. By adding interaction terms using age-related and KNHIS category-related dummy variables, we add flexibility to the model in equation (11). We also modify equation (5) as follows: (11) and (12) by using maximum likelihood estimation. Also, we estimate the benchmark models, which restrict the correlation between the two model shocks (" it and ν it ) to be equal to 0, thereby ignoring the self-selection problem. We compare the goodness-of-fit measures (AIC and BIC) of the baseline and time variant effect models and observe that the time variant effect models are to be preferred in terms of both AIC and BIC. Detailed results are in Appendix C. Table 7 reports the estimation results of the proposed time variant effect model. The coefficient of FHC it captures the immediate effect of the first health check on healthcare utilization and the coefficient of TEFHC it represents the time variant effects. We find that the estimated coefficients of FHC it and TEFHC it are significant and positive in all three dependent variables. This result indicates that, after the first general health check, people increase their level of healthcare utilization immediately, and this level continues to increase as time elapses. In the benchmark models that restrict the correlation ρ to be equal to 0, the coefficients of FHC it are overestimated and those of TEFHC it are underestimated. Moreover, the estimated coefficient of TEFHC it is not significant in Critical.Exp it . The estimates of ρ are significant and positive in all three dependent variables, implying that there are self-selection problems in all three dependent variables. In our data, the average of TEFHC it is 3.13 (minimum, 1; maximum, 12). Given this distribution of TEFHC it -values, the overall effect of general health checks on healthcare utilization is overstated when self-selection is ignored. Also, this is consistent with our findings from the baseline model results. 
Heterogeneity model
The effects of the first health check on the use of medical services may differ by the demographic and socio-economic characteristics of individuals. In this section, we investigate this heterogeneity by using interaction models. Specifically, we modify equation (5) as follows:
where Het it = {Gender i , Income it }. By adding the interactions with gender or income level, we can examine whether the health check effects vary with these key individual characteristics. We refer to this model as the heterogeneity model and estimate it by using maximum likelihood estimation. We find that all the estimates of β 3 are significant, supporting the existence of heterogeneity in health check effects. We first examine how the general health check effect varies with gender. For ease of interpretation, we show the expected values of the dependent variables before and after the first general health check for males and females in Fig. 3 . In terms of total expenses, females use more healthcare services before the first health check than do males, and the first health check boosts total expenses in both genders. In expenses for critical diseases, females use more healthcare services than do males before the first health check. The increase of expenses for critical diseases after the first health check is overwhelming in males, and consequently males spend more for critical diseases than do females after the first health checks. We can interpret this as indicating that critical diseases are more frequently detected through general health checks in males, who used healthcare services less than do females before their first health checks. We find that males show a higher incidence of medical records in circulatory diseases, diabetes and liver diseases (i.e. 0.32, 0.16 and 0.10 respectively) compared with females (i.e. 0.22, 0.08 and 0.06 respectively). Moreover, the incidence of medical records for these diseases more than doubles (i.e. 0.79, 0.33 and 0.21 respectively) after general health checks and this mainly drives the dramatic increase in critical expenditure among males. In days of visits, females visit healthcare institutions more frequently than do males before the first health check. After the health check, both genders visit more frequently than before.
Next, we examine how the health check effects vary with income group. Fig. 4 shows the expected values of the dependent variables before and after the first health check for each income group. First, we interpret the results for income group 0. People in this group have the lowest income level and are the medical aid beneficiaries. This group makes up about 4% of our sample and people in this group do not pay health insurance fees. In total expenses, people in . 3 . Effects of first health check and gender ('before' . / denotes the 95% confidence intervals for the comparison of the baseline group (i.e. males) with other groups before the first health checks; 'after' . / denotes the 95% confidence intervals for the comparison of the baseline group (i.e. males) with other groups after the first health checks; 'within' . / denotes the 95% confidence intervals for the comparison of the before-first health check values with the after-first health check values in the same group): (a) Total.Exp; (b) Critical.Exp; (c) Days.Visit this group spend W151 before their first health check and W22719 (an increase of about 15 fold) after a health check on average. Although this is a very great increase, the total expenses after the first health check by this group are only 20.75% (W22719) of the total expenses by other groups after the first health check (W109493). In the expenses for critical diseases, this group spends only 35.62% (W3.71) of the average value spent by the other groups before health checks (W10.42), but this value sharply increases after health checks and their expenses then become much higher than for the other groups. In number of days visiting healthcare institutions, this group also visits the least frequently (only 27.22% (1.49 days) the number of the other groups (5.49 days)) before the first health check, but the value of this variable also sharply increases and becomes comparable with that of the other groups after health checks.
We find that medical aid beneficiaries (i.e. income group 0) are different from other income groups because the households in this group must apply for this social security benefit and satisfy certain conditions. The majority of them cannot participate in economic activities and thus have no real income (note that this is one of the selection criteria). People in this group do not pay health insurance fees to the KNHIS. However, medical aid beneficiaries still must pay out-ofpocket payments for various healthcare services and diseases. For some selected diseases, the KNHIS reimburses the out-of-pocket payments. We think that out-of-pocket payments can be highly burdensome to medical aid beneficiaries given their extremely low income level and this explains the dramatic difference between income group 0 and others. We also find that medical aid beneficiaries have three times the number of unsatisfied medical needs compared with others (Lee, 2017) . Among the medical aid beneficiaries who reported having some unsatisfied medical needs, 66.2% reported that they have not used healthcare services because of economic reasons . 4 . Effect of first health check and income group ('before' . / denotes the 95% confidence intervals for the comparison of the baseline group (i.e. income group 0) with other groups before the first health checks; 'after' . / denotes the 95% confidence intervals for the comparison of the baseline group (i.e. income group 0) with other groups after the first health checks; 'within' . / denotes the 95% confidence intervals for the comparison of the before-first health check values with the after-first health check values in the same group): (a) Total.Exp; (b) Critical.Exp; (c) Days.Visit (Sohn and Kim, 2017) . All these findings are consistent with our explanation for the dramatic difference of income group 0.
In conclusion, we find that the first health check substantially increases the overall healthcare utilization of medical aid beneficiaries (income group 0), who were marginalized in the usage of healthcare services before the first health check. In particular, the first health check dramatically increases their usage of healthcare services related to critical diseases, and this group's expenses for critical diseases become the highest after health checks. However, their total usage level of healthcare services is only 20.75% that of the other groups even after the health check, whereas their days of healthcare institution visits are comparable with those of the others. This implies that medical aid beneficiaries' healthcare services are still limited to low cost visits.
We now turn to the interpretation of the results for the other income groups (income groups 1-10). We observe that their healthcare utilization and income level have a positive correlation before the general health check. This tendency is most pronounced in total expenses. After the first general health check, healthcare utilization increases for all income groups. Interestingly, the variations in total expenses and days visiting healthcare institutions across income groups shrink after the first health check. Specifically, the coefficient of variation in total expenses is 0.46 before the health check, which decreases to 0.07 after the health check. Similarly, the coefficient of variation in days visiting healthcare institutions decreases from 0.11 to 0.04. In contrast, the coefficient of variation in expenses for critical diseases increases from 0.13 to 0.18. Whereas the expenses for critical diseases show a positive association with income level before health checks, they have a negative association after health checks. This implies that the general health check is effective in detecting critical diseases among low income people, who used healthcare services less than high income people before their first health checks.
To summarize, we find that the general health check has a positive effect on healthcare utilization with a disproportionate intensity according to income level. Lower income groups, who show a low level of overall health care utilization before health checks, increase their service usage more sharply than higher income groups, making their usage level comparable with that of higher income groups after health checks in total expenses and days of visits. The disproportionate increase is more pronounced in expenses for critical diseases, resulting in a negative relationship between expenses for critical diseases and income level after the health check. We conclude that the general health check makes medically underprivileged low income people pay attention to critical diseases that they may have and obtain proper treatment for them, causing all groups to obtain benefits of healthcare services more equal.
Policy simulation
Modifying the eligibility plan is a handy tool for governments or public entities to encourage or discourage the health check obtaining behaviour of the general public. As we have seen in the previous sections, the general health check has a substantial and lasting influence on overall healthcare utilization. Our empirical framework consists of a latent utility model of health check Although simple, the structural specification of the model enables us to perform various counterfactual analyses investigating the changes in several outcomes due to policy changes. In this section, we perform a series of counterfactual policy simulations to measure the effect of changes in eligibility plans on healthcare utilization. Using the framework proposed, we can precisely estimate the changes in healthcare demand while circumventing self-selection bias.
Recently, growing attention has been paid to the modification of health checks. The chronic diseases striking people in their 20s and 30s have increased significantly because of several factors, such as unhealthy eating habits, lifestyle and heightened stress (Park et al., 2004; Schulze et al., 2004; Ke et al., 2015) . However, people in this age group cannot obtain the free health checks that are supported by the KNHIS unless they are employed or registered as individual insurance subscribers. With increasing rates of unemployment and growing incidences of chronic or critical diseases at earlier ages, public opinion has noted that these young adults are marginalized in healthcare services. Moreover, many people also believe that biennial health checks may not be sufficient to detect chronic diseases effectively (Hunt et al., 1999; Suka et al., 2009) . Given this public mood, healthcare authorities and law makers are considering changing current eligibility plans.
Public health policies can have a significant budgetary effect, and the consequences of their modification can also be enormous. Thus, an accurate cost-benefit and capacity analysis is of critical importance before modifying such policies. In this section, changes in the use of medical services are simulated by using the proposed model under counterfactual policies in which the beginning age and frequency of eligibility for free health checks are modified. The total expenses, expenses for critical diseases and days visiting healthcare institutions can be estimated on the basis of new modified hypothetical policies, which can help policy makers and managers in the healthcare sector to predict budgets for the KNHIS, changes needed in insurance premiums and demand for medical services. First, we explain the counterfactual policy simulation procedure. The probability of obtaining the first health check at H i,p = τ can be derived as follows:
Pr.U it,p < 0/ Pr.U iτ ,p 0/ if τ = 2, : : : , T ,
where the subscript p denotes an eligibility policy. The expected value of the dependent variables Y it,p under a policy p, given the first general health check at H i,p = τ , can be derived as follows: . 15/ Note that the unconditional expected value of ν it,p is 0, but given a first health check at H i,p = τ the expected value is not 0 because of the correlation between the error terms in the health check and healthcare utilization models. As in Heckman (1979) , we can derive the expected value as
.16/ Using the conditional expectation E[Y it,p |H i,p = τ ] and the probability of obtaining the first health check at H i,p = τ , the unconditional expectation of Y it,p can be derived as follows:
We predict the changes in the use of medical services under two hypothetical changes in policies:
(a) changing the beginning age of eligibility for free health checks and (b) changing the frequency of eligibility for free health checks.
6.1. Changing the beginning age of eligibility for free health checks Under the current eligibility plan, people are eligible for free health checks from the ages of 20 years (category 1) or 40 years (the other categories in our sample). We predict the changes in healthcare utilization due to hypothetical modifications of the beginning age of free health checks. More specifically, we change the current beginning age of 40 years of categories 2, 4, 5 and 6 to 38 and 42 years. We refer to the current policy as p = 0, the policy with the starting age of 38 years as p = 1 (policy 1) and the policy with the starting age of 42 years as p = 2 (policy 2). We compute the expected values of the dependent variables under various policies for each individual in our sample and then aggregate the individual expected values. Fig. 5 reports the results. To focus on the changes in healthcare utilization compared with utilization under the current policy, we plot the percentage changes in demands for medical services under alternative policies in Fig. 6 . The total demand for medical services under policy 1 compared with that under the current policy increases from 2005, when the samples began to be eligible for free health checks under policy 1. The demand under policy 2 decreases from 2007, when the samples begin to be eligible for free health checks under policy 0. The differences between policy 0 and policy 1 in total expenditures increase until reaching a maximum in 2008 (a 19.1% increase) and then decrease. The differences between policy 0 and policy 2 in total expenditures increase until 2010 (a 15.6% decrease) and then slowly decrease. Other measures for medical services show similar patterns. The gaps in the expenditures for critical diseases and the days of healthcare institution visits are not as great as for the total expenditures (changes of less than 10%).
Changing the frequency of eligibility for free health checks
Individuals in our sample are eligible for free health checks at even ages above 20 years (category 1) or 40 years (the other categories). We now examine the policies in which the frequency of eligibility is changed. Specifically, we consider policies where individuals are eligible for free health checks every year (policy 3) and every 4 years (policy 4). As in the previous section, we compute the expected values of the dependent variables under policies 3 and 4 for each individual in our sample and then aggregate the values. Fig. 7 reports the results. To focus on the changes in healthcare utilization compared with utilization under the current policy, we plot the percentage changes in demand for medical services under the alternative policies in Fig. 8 .
Unlike the changes in demand under different starting points in the eligibility (policies 1 and 2), the demand for medical services changes from the beginning of the sample period. This is because people in category 1 are eligible for free health checks from age 20 years either every year (policy 3) or every 4 years (policy 4). The differences between the hypothetical policies and the current policy gradually increase, showing different trends compared with those of Fig. 6 . Table 8 reports the total expenditures, expenditures for critical diseases and days of medical institution visits aggregated over the sample period under different policies. Among the four hypothetical policies that were considered (policies 1-4), policy 3 increases healthcare utilization the most in all three dependent variables. Table 9 provides the expected values with 5% and 95% percentiles of healthcare utilizations under hypothetical policies. We use a Monte Carlo simulation with 10000 iterations to compute the percentiles.
Conclusion
As one of the most common forms of preventive healthcare, general health checks are obtained by many people in many countries. Previous empirical studies have documented mixed results regarding the effect of the general health check on subsequent healthcare utilization. Moreover, the results from many of these studies must be interpreted with caution because of their limitations in terms of sample size, representativeness of the sample and/or the self-selection problem. In this study, we estimate the effect of general health checks on subsequent healthcare utilization by using a large and representative sample provided by the KNHIS. We specifically focus on changes in the total amount of all medical expenses, the total amount of expenses related to critical diseases and the number of days visiting healthcare institutions as key measures of healthcare utilization. More importantly, we tackle the self-selection issue by using the instrumental variable approach. The eligibility for free health checks has unique exogenous variations in Korea. People can obtain a health check for free when their age is an even number, starting from the age of 40 years (20 years for some subgroups). After controlling for the effects of age along with other observed control variables, whether people are even aged or odd aged is unlikely to be correlated with their healthcare utilization, but this determines whether they can obtain health checks for free or not and thus influences the decision whether or not to have a health check at all. Using this information as an instrumental variable, we extend the empirical approach of Lee (1983) and Heckman (1979) to model the obtaining of health checks with healthcare utilization jointly.
We find that the total expenses, the expenses for critical diseases and the number of days visiting healthcare institutions increase by factors of 4.0, 2.0 and 1.4 after the first general health check respectively. There is a significant positive self-selection bias, which substantially overstates the effects when ignored. The time variant effect model shows that the health check effect has a large immediate effect, followed by lasting gradual increases. Also, the health check effect shows notable heterogeneity across gender and income groups. Before the first health check, the healthcare utilizations of females are higher in all three dependent variables than those of males. The first health check boosts healthcare utilization in both genders in all three dependent variables but disproportionately increases expenses for critical diseases in males, resulting in higher healthcare usage levels by males in expenses for critical diseases after health checks. Before the first health check, there are large variations in the level of healthcare utilization across income groups. Specifically, a strong positive correlation between the level of income and healthcare utilization is observed. The first health check increases levels of healthcare usage in all income groups. However, the higher the income level, the smaller the size of the effect. Consequently, health checks substantially reduce variations in the total expenses and the days visiting healthcare institutions across income groups.
Our study provides several critical implications for researchers, policy makers and managers in the health services sector. Most choices in healthcare treatment are made by service users themselves and are thus subject to self-selection problems. Also, in most cases, experiments are not a feasible option. Our empirical study illustrates that exogenous variations in policy can help researchers to handle self-selection bias by providing useful instrumental variables. As in our case, measuring the effectiveness of treatments or interventions is critical in policy or strategy evaluation and optimization. As such, incorporating exogenous variations in the policy can be beneficial for assessment purposes. This aspect of the policy should be considered as a critical criterion when selecting competing policies in the healthcare context.
The general health check is a major pillar of the public health business with an annual budget of over $750 million in Korea. Policy makers and law makers, who have recently been considering changes in the free-check eligibility plan, can benefit from our study. The approach proposed is a structural model rather than a reduced form model and therefore it does not suffer from the Lucas critique and can be used to predict the effects of a shift to a policy regime which is different from the current regime. We propose a method to simulate the effect of the hypothetical policy changes on individuals' behaviour of obtaining general health checks and its effect on the use of medical services. The method provides predictions on the trajectory of an individual's healthcare utilization and the demands for medical services in aggregate level under counterfactual policies. Cost-benefit analyses can be performed using the predicted values before making decisions on policies. Also, on the basis of the predicted values, health service providers can plan and prepare their resources ahead of time to meet the demand.
Creating health equity is a key priority for many governments and global organizations, such as the World Health Organization. The development status of a society is judged not only by the average quality of its population's health but also how fairly health levels are distributed across the social spectrum. Among many factors, socio-economic status and level of education are both strong predictors of health and key drivers underlying health inequities across populations (Marmot et al., 2008) . In this study, we find that there is a strong positive correlation between overall healthcare utilization levels and income levels before the first general health check. However, we also find that health checks make total healthcare expenses and the days of visiting healthcare institutions comparable across income groups, substantially reducing inequity in the usage of medical services. By detecting diseases, sensitizing individuals to their health and wellbeing and/or providing relevant health education, general health checks disproportionately boost the level of usage of healthcare services among underprivileged, low income populations. Our findings imply that general health checks can be regarded as a vehicle to promote equity in health. Similarly to our findings, Baker and Middleton (2003) found that a primary healthcare intervention such as an organized programme of cervical screening can contribute to reducing inequality in population health. Also, in a similar vein, Public Health England (2017) underlined the importance of general health checks in reducing health inequalities by encouraging people to think about their health and wellbeing and by increasing their knowledge and awareness of health risks and what help is available to them.
Although the general health check results in the highest increase in the total expenses of medical aid beneficiaries (4% of the population; the lowest income group), the average total expenses of this group is a mere 20.75% of the average of the other income groups after the first health check. The government and public sector need to address this issue further and to close the gap between medical aid beneficiaries and others in higher income groups. Also, we observe that expenses for critical diseases among low income groups and males are lower than others before the general health checks but these become higher than others after the health checks. This finding indicates that the rate of incidence of critical diseases may be higher but less care is taken among these groups before health checks. Again, the healthcare sector needs to address this issue.
There are several limitations in this study. We use three dependent variables for measuring the effects of general health checks, and they do not directly measure health conditions. A straightforward extension of our study is to examine the effect of general health checks on health outcome variables such as morbidity and mortality. Again, in measuring the effect of general health checks on these health outcome variables, handling the self-selection problem is the primary empirical challenge. By adopting our proposed approach, researchers can tackle the self-selection issue. Also, longer observation periods are needed to evaluate the preventive effect of health checks on morbidity and mortality.
Another healthcare setting where the method proposed can be applied is the measurement of health screening effects. The self-selection problem can be a critical challenge in the study of health screening because the effect of health screening is measured from people who voluntarily comply with the screening invitation in most cases. By leveraging exogenous variations as instrumental variables, our method can be applied in this literature.
We focus on the effects of the first health check in this study. Effects of repeated health checks may exist and can be different from the effect of the first health check. We hope that this research will encourage the further investigation of the distinct effect of repeated health checks from that of the first health check.
We assume that " it and ν it follow a bivariate normal distribution:
for t = 1, : : : , H i :
. 20/ For t > H i , we assume that the idiosyncratic error of the healthcare utilization model follows a univariate normal distribution:
ν it ∼ N.0, σ 2 ν, a / for t = H i + 1, : : : , T: .21/
Since the distributions of " t and ν t are specified above, they can be transformed to a standard normal random variable:
We can combine them into a single bivariate normal distribution as follows:
H.", ν; ρ/ = B{J 1 ."/, J 2 .ν/; ρ}, B.·, ·; ρ/ = BVN 0 0 , 1 ρ ρ 1 :
. 24/ Then we can write the joint density of " and ν by using the relationship between transformed errors " Å and ν Å :
We can write the utility of obtaining a general health check at year t as a function of " it : if
.26/ otherwise,
The joint probability of having received her or his first general health check .FHC it = 1/ and the use of healthcare services as Y it , given t H i , can be written as
We need to calculate the continuous-discrete joint density function of FHC it = 1 and Y it :
. 31/ In contrast, for observations with t > H i , the probability of an individual i's use of healthcare services equal to Y it is
We can derive the joint likelihood function of general health check and healthcare utilization for an individual i as follows:
ρ} is a set of parameters to estimate. The log-likelihood for the entire sample is ln{L.θ/} = Σ N i=1 ln{L i .θ/} where N denotes the sample size.
Appendix B: Simulation study
This study investigates the effect of general health checks on health utilization by jointly modelling the individuals' decisions to participate in health checks and their subsequent utilization of healthcare resources. Our modelling approach is similar to Heckman (1979) and Lee (1983) in that it uses instrumental variables for the model specification and jointly models the selection process and the dependent variable of interest. Unlike Lee (1983) , our selection process takes the form of a duration model. To check the validity and performance of the model proposed, we perform a simulation study. The simulation samples consist of 100 individuals, each with 20 observations (T = 20, in years). Each individual is aged 31 years .Age i1 = 31/ at the start of the observation period .t = 1/ and aged 50 years .Age iT = 50/ at the end of the observation period .t = T = 20/. For simplicity, we assume two types of policy that grant eligibility for free health checks. First-type individuals are eligible to obtain free general health checks once in 2 years at even-numbered age, from the beginning of the observation .p = 1/. Second-type individuals are eligible to obtain free general health checks once in 2 years at even-numbered age, from age 40 years .p = 2/. Individuals are randomly assigned to these types of policy.
The latent utility of obtaining a general health check at year t in policy p, U ip, t , is defined as U ip, t = α 0 + α 1 Eligible ip, t + α 2 Age it + " ip, t , t = 1, 2, : : : , H i , .34/ U ip, t < 0 for t = 1, 2, : : : , H i − 1 and U ip, t 0 at t = H i .35/ where Eligible ip, t is a dummy variable that indicates whether individual i is eligible to obtain a health check for free .Eligible ip, t = 1/ or not .Eligible ip, t = 0/ in policy p at year t. H i refers to the year when individual i obtains his or her first health check. Given H i or the timing of the first health check, the utility of obtaining health check-ups is less than 0 at t = 1, 2, : : : , H i − 1 and greater than or equal to 0 at H i . If an individual has not obtained a general health check until the end of the observation period .t = T = 20/, then H i > 20 (this is a censored observation). Dummy variable FHC ip, t , which denotes whether individual i has received her or his first health check in policy p at year t, can be defined by the above latent utility: FHC ip, t = 1 i fU ip, t 0 or .t 2 and FHC ip, t−1 = 1/, 0 otherwise:
.36/
The use of healthcare services by individual i in policy p at year t, Y ip, t , is modelled as Y ip, t = β 0 + β 1 FHC ip, t + β 2 Age it + ν ip, t :
. 37/ In our modelling framework, self-selection is represented as correlation between unobserved shocks of the two idiosyncratic error terms (" ip, t and ν ip, t ). We assume that " ip, t and ν ip, t follow a bivariate normal distribution for t H i , and ν ip, t follows a univariate normal distribution for t > H i :
" ip, t ν ip, t ∼ BVN 0 0 , 1 ρσ ν ρσ ν σ 2 ν for t = 1, : : : , H i , .38/ ν ip, t IID ∼ N.0, σ 2 ν, a / for t = H i+1 , : : : , T , σ a = σ ν, a − σ ν , .39/
The standard deviation of the error term in the healthcare utilization model is allowed to change from σ ν to σ ν, a after H i . The difference of the standard deviations is labelled as σ a . We generated two data sets, S.Data1 and S.Data2, with different correlation values, with ρ = 0:5 and ρ = 0 respectively. We checked whether our empirical model works well in both cases. We also checked the effect of self-selection bias when the self-selection problem is ignored, even though unobserved shocks of the two submodels are correlated, by estimating benchmark models with correlation parameter ρ being fixed as 0 (models (S.B1) and (S.B2)). We ran 1000 simulations for each case, and we report the estimation results in Table 10 . ) for estimated values of 1000 simulations are reported. Models (S.1) and (S.2) are estimates of the model proposed by using data set S.Data1 and S.Data2. The fourth and sixth columns, labelled (S.B1) and (S.B2), are estimates with the correlation parameter ρ fixed as 0. ‡p-value less than 0.01. The proposed model (S.1) fits better than the benchmark (S.B1) in terms of AIC and BIC, because the data set S.Data1 has common unobservable factors between the health check model and healthcare utilization model, which can only be handled by proposed model (S.1). However, model (S.B2) shows a better fit than does model (S.2) because the estimation of correlation between the two models adds an unnecessary parameter to estimate despite the independence between the two processes.
The model proposed performs well, recovering true parameter values consistently in the case of models (S.1) and (S.2). The parameter estimates of ρ, which handles self-selection, is estimated accurately. On the basis of simulation results, we can prove that our modelling framework can correctly detect the selfselection issue, which is represented as correlation between unobserved shocks of the two submodels. It also nests the case when there is an independence relationship between two processes.
Serious estimation biases are detected in the estimates of the intercept and FHC ip, t of the healthcare utilization model (S.B1) when positive correlation between two idiosyncratic errors is ignored and the estimates are taken as if the health check model and healthcare utilization model are independent. These results highlight the importance of handling the self-selection issue in measuring the effect of a general health check. Table 11 compares the goodness-of-fit measures (AIC and BIC) of the baseline and time variant effect models. We observe that the time variant effect models are to be preferred in terms of both AIC and BIC. Also, we observe that the models proposed are better than the benchmark models that ignore the self-selection problem.
Appendix C: Goodness-of-fit measures of the baseline and time variant effect model
